When it comes to language, while the deaf and hearing use the same written form of English, when “spoken,” American Sign Language employs very different forms of syntax, expression, word order and grammatical structure as compared to spoken English. As a result, sometimes, especially with deaf people younger than the so-called Generation X, the norms of spoken American Sign Language become intermingled with a deaf person’s written English, often to the extent that it causes a language barrier. Therefore, practitioners must be sensitive when communicating with a deaf person and realize that sometimes written communication may not be as effective as it would be with a hearing person.

In addition to the above, a common misconception among the hearing is that the deaf can simply lip read in order to effectively communicate. Unfortunately, lip reading is a very inexact science, withmany words unsuccessfully read during a typical conversation. Even if the general gist of an attorney’s point is communicated, this is insufficient, as legal advice is generally fairly complicated and requires, as much as practicable, the full understanding of the client and not simply getting the gist across. Besides, not all deaf people have the skill of lip reading; presuming that they do is simply a hearing person’s stereotype of the deaf.

The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits an attorney from denying services because of an “absence of auxiliary aids and services.” These services include a sign language interpreter; however, a firm is not required to use an interpreter if it would result in an “undue burden.” While the cost for the interpreter is to be absorbed by the attorney, an attorney may bill for the extra time it may take to effectively communicate with a deaf client. In order to offset some of these costs, the Pennsylvania and Philadelphia bar associations established the Interpreter Access Fund. In addition, it may be possible to secure a tax credit for an attorney’s special expenditures to serve a deaf person pursuant to the Disability Access Credit.

Finally, a variety of organizations exist to help the deaf navigate the legal system and achieve justice. These organizations include the Disabilities Rights Network, the Pennsylvania School for the Deaf, the Legal Clinic for the Disabled, the National Association for the Deaf, and deaflegal.org. It is worthwhile for an attorney to investigate each of these if one intends to represent the deaf on a regular basis.

Originally published on May 18, 2012 in “The Legal Intelligencer Blog” and can be found here.

The unemployment compensation claimant in the matter-at-issue, Charlene L. Henney (hereinafter “Claimant”) worked the 3:30pm to midnight shift for the Philadelphia Parking Authority (hereinafter “Employer”). Due to the late hours, and the lack of work for her to do, she would occasionally become drowsy. In order to combat her drowsiness, she often requested additional work from Employer for her to do. Despite the Claimant’s efforts to secure additional work, Employer failed to provide any save on two occasions. Claimant eventually developed some health problems, was hospitalized, and diagnosed with sleep apnea.

On at least four separate occasions Claimant fell asleep during her 3:30pm to midnight shift. Employer terminated Claimant’s employment and contested her application for unemployment compensation. At an unemployment compensation referee’s hearing, Employer argued that Claimant committed willful misconduct and demonstrated that Claimant slept on the job, that it had a specific work rule proscribing sleeping on the job of which Claimant was aware, and that it was Claimant’s alleged violation of the rule against sleeping on the job that caused her to be terminated. In response, Claimant did not deny sleeping on the job. Instead, she testified that she suffered from sleep apnea which caused involuntary sleeping. In addition, she further testified that she requested additional work from Employer in order to help her remain awake during the late hours of her shift and Employer failed to provide the work requested.

In making its decision, the Court had to determine what constitutes willful misconduct. In its review of the applicable law, the Court noted that willful misconduct requires a wanton, intentional, or willful disregard for an employer’s interests, deliberate violation of an employer’s rules, and/or intentional disregard for standards an employer can expect from an employee. The employer has the burden to prove that the claimant was aware of the work rule and willfully, intentionally, and/or deliberately violated it. A Court is to review all of the claimant’s actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the reasons for non-compliance with the work rule. If the employer can meet its burden as described above, the burden shifts to the claimant who then has the burden to prove that her decision to violate the employer’s work rule was for good cause. A physical illness can constitute good cause to violate a work rule. If the claimant had good cause to violate the work rule, then a claimant can be eligible for unemployment benefits. A claimant’s own testimony can serve a competent testimony to her own medical problems.

The Court ruled that the Employer did not meet its burden of proof. The Court found that the Claimant recognized that working late hours with little work to do made her understandably drowsy. The Court further found that the Claimant acted in a responsible manner by informing the Employer of her lack of work, and drowsiness, by asking for additional work. The Employer had the opportunity to provide the work, but failed to do so. Based on the all of the surrounding circumstances, the Court ruled that Claimant’s falling asleep at her position was not the result of any willful, deliberate, or intentional act but the natural result of late nights with little to no work to do. In other words, the Court ruled that Claimant did not intentionally go to sleep while on duty. Due to the fact that the Employer did not meet its burden, the Court did not have to engage in any analysis into Claimant’s sleep apnea as the burden never shifted to Claimant.

In the final analysis, when it comes to whether a claimant is eligible for benefits, a Claimant must commit willful misconduct to be deemed ineligible. If the action – though misconduct – was not done willfully, then a claimant will be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, even if that misconduct was sleeping on the job.

Originally published on May 2, 2012 in “Upon Further Review” and can be found here.

The news media often carry articles and stories about law firms, but much of this coverage is due to news releases sent by marketing departments or public relations agencies hired by these firms. Most law forms who can afford these types of services are large law firms or occasional, specialized firms who handle cases in areas of the law where verdicts can be large, such as catastrophic personal injury. Therefore, it can appear to the average person that these types of firms rule the practice of law.

Yet, statistics are surprisingly to the contrary. Of lawyers in private practice, estimated to be 70% of all lawyers in America, or 635,000 lawyers, 48% of them, or 435,000 lawyers, work alone (they are called solo practitioners). The remaining 22% of lawyers, or 200,000 lawyers, practice in law firms of between 2 and 20 lawyers. I would guess that of that total, a high percentage of the 70% represent individuals and small business rather than large corporations. Yet, the myriad of rules and the high costs associated with participating in the legal system is prohibitive for average Americans, or the 99%ers. Although I am not advocating that the legal system be Occupied, perhaps the 70% of private lawyers practicing individually and in small law firms, and the 99% of average American, should work together to find a way to make the legal system more user friendly and less expensive to clients and their lawyers.

You can find this post and more on Ms. Cohen’s blog Toughlawyerlady here.

Marcus v. PQ Corp.,  Nos. 11-2009, 11-2006 slip op. (3^rd Cir. Jan. 19, 2012), dealt with a handful of Plaintiffs who were all terminated from their employment with PQ Corporation (“PQ”) not long after PQ purchased their previous employer back in 2005.  All of the Plaintiffs were over fifty-five years old at the time of their termination and, as discovery eventually revealed, no one under fifty-five was terminated by PQ.  Consequently, due to what the Plaintiffs believed to be something other than coincidence as to their commonality of all being over fifty-five and terminated from their employment, they brought suit against PQ for violating the ADEA.  After a trial on the matter, a jury entered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs, awarding the two appealing Plaintiff sums of approximately $2.5 Million each.

After the trial, both parties appealed the decision: PQ appealed the decision on the basis of jury instructions and a matter of law, and the Plaintiffs appealed the decision on the basis of taking issue with the calculation of damages awarded.

PQ’s appeal was multifaceted with regard to its issues with the jury instructions, raising four different arguments.  PQ first argued that the jury instructions did not accurately reflect the “but-for” causation established by Gross.  Per the Gross decision, in order for an employer to be liable under ADEA, a plaintiff must show that “but for” the alleged age discrimination, he would not have been terminated.  The court ruled that it would not reverse a decision unless the lower court’s jury instructions “as a whole fail to correctly state the burden of proof [and, r]ead together, [the lower court’s instructions] were not deficient.”

PQ next argued that the jury instructions should not have included an instruction indicating liability can attach to an employer due to the animus of a non-decision-maker (the so-called “cat’s paw”).  The court ruled that, under applicable law pursuant to the ADEA, “it is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate…[I]f a supervisor performs an act motivated by…animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment actions, then the employer is liable….”  The court further elaborated saying “the underlying principles of agency upon which subordinate bias theories are based apply equally to all types of employment discrimination.”  Therefore, the instruction was appropriate.

PQ’s third argument was that the jury should have been given a specific business-judgment instruction.  A business-judgment instruction is one that makes it clear that an employer can make personnel decisions based on business considerations.  The court ruled that the jury instruction “the defendant had a right to hire and fire its employees whenever they [sic] wanted to, as long as they [sic] didn’t do it because of age” was sufficient to ensure the jury understood the law of business-judgment.

PQ’s fourth argument was that the lower court was not impartial in its jury instructions as a whole; however as the court ruled that the individual instructions described above were each acceptable, there is no question as to the impartiality of the instructions taken as a whole.

PQ then argued that judgment ought to have been entered in its favor as a matter of law.  When considering this argument, the court was unconvinced.  The court indicated that the Plaintiffs presented “considerable evidence” in support of their claims, including how PQ changed its reasons for termination over time, how it terminated only those employees over fifty-five years old, how the terminations are statistically significant as opposed to happenstance (even when controlling for alleged business decisions), and how statements from various people at PQ seemed to indicate a bias against older employees.  PQ argued that the evidence described above is insufficient to warrant a verdict in the Plaintiffs’ favor, however the court ruled that it is a jury’s discretion to weigh the evidence available and the above is sufficient to justify is verdict.

Finally, PQ argued that the award of the jury was inappropriate as it awarded damages for emotional distress in the absence of serious harm.  PQ argued that the size of the award reflected the jury’s ruling on passion and prejudice as opposed to measured consideration and, therefore, PQ should be entitled to a new trial.  The court quickly dismissed this argument citing well established case law indicating that the size of an award is not enough to prove the verdict was rendered due to passion and prejudice.  PQ then argued that the jury must have rendered its verdict due to passion and prejudice because it only spent three hours to deliberate, however again the court was not persuaded as it, again, cited a variety of case law indicating time spent deliberating is not dispositive.

Plaintiffs also raised arguments on appeal.  Plaintiffs argued that it should have been entitled to prejudgment interest and an adjustment for negative tax consequences.  The court ruled that one of the purposes of damages is to make an injured party whole; it also noted that an abuse of discretion in awarding damages “occurs when a district court deviates from this policy without a reasoned explanation.”  The court ruled that consideration of prejudgment interest and negative tax consequences were typical and the lower court’s denial of the above requested damages, contained in a single sentence, was clearly not a reasoned explanation for its deviation from the norm.  Therefore, the court ruled that the prejudgment interests and accounting for negative tax consequences were appropriate to make the Plaintiffs whole.

The applicability of the ADEA is in flux since the Gross decision.  The case of Marcus v. PQ Corporation will serve to make the ADEA’s applicability clearer in the wake of Gross, and help practitioners to more effectively and appropriately use it for the benefit of their clients.

Originally published in the Legal Intelligencer on May 9, 2012 and can be found here.

I compared that scene to the scene in Philadelphia’s Family Court, where I spent a good part of the prior day. Hundreds of people, usually low income and minorities, spend hours and hours waiting in a large room until their cases are called. These members of society are the least able to afford to lose income by taking time off of work or taking off time to seek work waiting and waiting and waiting. When one looks around the room, it is a sad sight of a mass of humanity waiting for an overburdened court system, to govern their lives and families.

The case I was involved in resulted from allegations of inappropriate sexual conduct by a child toward his sibling. The family consisted of 5 children. That conduct was reported to the Department of Human Services. That report set in motion a process which involves numerous individuals who are appointed by the court to monitor, oversee, analyze, and represent various members of the family. This doesn’t include the judge and other members of the court system involved in monitoring and scheduling these type of cases. In this case four of the children have been sent to foster homes, and the fifth child is living with his great-grandmother. The parents’ rights are in the process of being terminated, and one of the childrens’ aunts who lives in another state is seeking to adopt them. I represent the maternal grandmother. Although each case is different, the pattern is similar. The pattern involves spending large amounts of money in a system which is very slow and ponderous. The persons who are being paid by the system include representatives of various agencies, child advocates, court-appointed lawyers for the parents, social workers, attorneys for the children, therapists, case workers, foster parents, and various agencies offering services. When one is involved in the system one cannot help but wonder if there is not a better, efficient, less emotionally taxing and far less expensive way of assisting these families, many of whom are impoverished and lacking in education and life’s skills. Yet, no one seems to have been able to suggest and/or implement such a system. And one wonders who would be interested in doing so, as most likely it is not individuals who are being paid by the system. Of the cases I have been involved in I am the only one being paid privately; everyone else is being paid by the taxpayers, which includes me. I am not suggesting that people involved in the system are overpaid, as that is not the case, and court-approved lawyers do not get rich through the system, and many of the people involved are dedicated to their taxing jobs. But, the sheer number of people involved in assisting each family, adds up to lots of effort and money. If the process was more streamlined or efficient, perhaps more private lawyers could become involved, because family members could afford their fees. As it currently stands, we have attended two hearings in a month which have both resulted in continuances after hours and hours of waiting. We are billing our clients to sit and wait, but as “a lawyer’s time and advice are his stock in trade”, a saying attributed to Abraham Lincoln, we have no choice.

You can find this post and more on Ms. Cohen’s blog Toughlawyerlady here!

There is no doubt that the red-light program has brought millions of dollars to Philadelphia in traffic fines and arguably has made our roadways safer; however, the question as to whether the program is constitutional remains outstanding. I have written about this issue before, in 2009, and, since that time, there has been little discussion regarding the constitutional aspects of the red-light cameras.

The constitutional issues are pretty clear. A traffic violation is a summary criminal offense (see: 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 106(c); Stumpf v. Nye, 2008 Pa. Super. 122 (2008), Commonwealth v. Henry, 2008 Pa. Super. 20 (2008), and Commonwealth v. Gimbara, 2003 Pa. Super. 394 (2003)). The burden of proof the commonwealth must meet, even for summary criminal offenses, is beyond a reasonable doubt (see Commonwealth v. A.D.B., 752 A.2d 438, Pa.Cmwlth. 2000 andCommonwealth v. Banellis, 452 Pa.Super. 478 (1996)). Logically speaking, then, the burden of proof for the commonwealth for the summary criminal offense of a traffic violation like running a red light is proving it beyond a reasonable doubt.

Despite the clear law described above, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3116(b), motorists caught by the red-light program are presumed to be liable and have to prove their own innocence. Clearly, the burden of proof under the red-light program turns the traditional American jurisprudence of “innocent until proven guilty” on its head. The single biggest reason for the constitutional issue is that the photographs taken are only of the rear of the car, as opposed to the face of the driver, capturing only the license plate and make and model of the car. At least if the photographs were of the driver’s face, there would be convincing proof of who the driver was who ran the red light. As it stands now, the ticket for running a red light under the red-light program is assessed to the owner of the car photographed from behind, regardless of who the actual driver was at the time of the violation, despite this not being the case for other traffic violations.

I have been told that the photographs are not taken of a driver’s face to protect his or her privacy, however that has no logical basis, as the license plate and make and model of the car reveals just as much information about the owner of the car as photographs from the front. Additionally, no one sees the photograph except for PennDOT, the owner of the car and perhaps the court and police. Somehow, I simply do not think opposing basic American constitutional jurisprudence is worth the cost of allegedly protecting privacy.

As the debate on the red-light program continues in Harrisburg, I hope that before any decision is made, some consideration is made of the constitutional issues described above and that our rights are protected. Allowing our rights to deteriorate in this limited way without opposition may be a harbinger for further erosion. Now that we have the opportunity to address this issue again, I hope the debate on the red-light program highlights this very important issue.

Originally published in the Legal Intelligencer Blog on April 17, 2012 and can be found here.

Despite these strict deadlines, I receive many calls each week from:
• people who have either sat on their legal rights, despite knowing they had deadlines, and missed their deadlines to sue;
• people who state they didn’t know about these deadlines, and don’t feel they should be held accountable for missing them;
• people who state they have been too busy to initiate a lawsuit, or it slipped their mind, or took some other action which they thought tolled the deadlines, but didn’t.

Where people took some other action they thought tolled their deadlines, there seems to be similar scenerios. In the first scenario, people have spent considerable time and energy discussing or writing about their issues with their elected city, state or federal government representatives, or their relatives, friends and neighbors. Yet, they never initiated a lawsuit in a timely matter. They are often surprised to learn that they have lost their rights to do so, because these contacts don’t toll statutes of limitation, even if the elected representatives state they are looking into one’s complaint or situation. TRUST MISLAID.

Often people will go to the courthouse and speak with a clerk who takes the time to explain the legal process to them. They do this instead of consulting with a lawyer. They then feel that the clerk is the font of significant knowledge, and tend to rely on what the clerk told them, which may or not be correct, and is often misinterpreted and limited, even if it is correct. Even if a clerk is sympathetic and agrees with them, it is a far cry from what is necessary in proving one’s case. A clerk’s information and/or advice, if incorrect, cannot be the basis of tolling a statute, or even a lawsuit. TRUST MISLAID.

Union members often rely on information the union representative, who is usually not a lawyer, provides them. However, the union representative’s advice is usually based on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, and often doesn’t involve other types of legal actions such as civil rights. I have seen many persons miss filing deadlines required to preserve their rights under civil right laws because they are waiting for a lengthy union process to conclude, and their union representative didn’t discuss other possible remedies with them. I am not criticizing union, but it is a good idea to consult a lawyer to learn if there are other possible remedies. TRUST MISLAID.

Many people feel that because they have discussed their case with a lawyer, or left their paperwork with a lawyer to review, this tolls their statute of limitation. Unless the lawyer has accepted the case, and there is a written fee agreement signed by the lawyer and the client, the lawyer does not have a responsibility to initiate a lawsuit. Although a lawyer is not supposed to decide at the last minute that he will not bring suit, so as to disadvantage a person, this happens frequently, so a person must diligently follow up with a lawyer, especially if some months have passed without word from the lawyer, or if the lawyer is not returning their telephone calls when they call about the status of their matter. TRUST MISLAID.

Therefore, it is important to preserve one’s legal remedies by consulting with a lawyer or lawyers as soon as possible for advice on whether one has a potential lawsuit or remedy. One should not mislay one’s trust on the wrong individuals.

To see this post and more, go to my blog Toughlawyerlady here!

The Amendments are designed to provide a statutory basis to create, facilitate the enforcement of, and standardize post-adoption contact agreements. A post-adoption contact agreement is one in which the adopting parent(s) enter into a contract with the adopted-child’s biological parent(s) and relative(s) to lay out the terms and conditions of the biological parent(s) and relative(s)’ contact and/or communication with the adopted-child after the adoption of the child is completed.

Under the terms of the Amendments, any post-adoption contract (“Contract”) must include four (4) essential elements. First, the Contract must be in the best interests of the adopted-child. Second, the Contract must indicate recognition of the parties’ interest and desire for ongoing communication and/or contract with the child. Third, the Contract’s terms are to be appropriate considering the role each party is to take in the adopted-child’s life after his adoption. Finally, fourth, the Contract is, of course, subject to the approval of the Court.

Approval of the court is dependent upon a variety of factors. First, the parties must enter into the Contract knowingly and voluntarily and an affidavit of the same must be made under oath to affirm the same and that coercion, fraud, and/or duress played no role in the formation of the Contract. Second, the court must determine that the Contract must be in the best interest of the adopted-child. When determining whether the Contract is in the best interests of the adopted-child, the court may consider factors as follows: “(i) The length of time that the child has been under actual care, custody and control of a person other than a birth parent and the circumstances relating thereto. (ii) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with birth relatives and other persons who routinely interact with the birth relatives and may significantly affect the child’s best interests. (iii) The adjustment to the child’s home, school and community. (iv) The willingness and ability of the birth relative to respect and appreciate the bond between the child and prospective adoptive parent. (v) The willingness and ability of the prospective adoptive parent to respect and appreciate the bond between the child and the birth relative. (vi) Any evidence of abuse or neglect of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2735(b)(2). A Contract may only be modified by an adoptive parent and/or adopted-child twelve (12) years old or older by filing an action with the court that finalized the adoption. A modification may only be approved by a Court if it “finds by clear and convincing evidence that modification serves the needs, welfare and best interest of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 2737(b).

The possible parties to the Contract are also specifically laid out by statute. The parties may include the adoptive parent(s) as well as so-called “birth relatives.” Birth relatives may include parents, grandparents, step-parents, siblings, uncles, and aunts. Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2733, siblings in this context also include the adopted-child’s blood siblings who are not also being adopted by the adopting parents. In the event that the adopted-child’s siblings are minors and are to have contact with the adopted-child post-adoption per a Contract, the minor siblings are to be represented by a guardian ad litem to negotiate the Contract. Finally, although the adopted-child is technically the subject of a Contract as opposed to a party, if the adopted-child is twelve (12) years old or older, the Contract cannot be ratified unless the adopted-child gives his consent.

The Amendments also include notice requirements for the Contract and its filing. The requirements for notice are unclear and nebulous. It is notable that while a variety of birth relatives may be parties to the Contract, only the birth parents have to be given notice and there is no requirement to provide the presumptive father notice. There is also virtually no guidance of how notice is to be provided. The only guidelines provided by the Amendments for notice is that it must be provided, and court approved, before the entrance of the adoption decree. Furthermore, sufficient time must be provided to the birth parents to engage the process of contracting before the expiration of the thirty (30) day period wherein they may revoke their consent to the adoption process.

The Amendments also lay out enforcement and discontinuance provisions. The Amendments state rather obviously that a Contract can only be enforced if it is in compliance with the terms of the Amendments described above. The Amendments first make clear that regardless of whether the Contract is violated, the adoption decree cannot be set aside on that basis alone. When seeking enforcement, a party may only see specific performance of the Contract. A party may only seek enforcement of the Contract if that same party is also in substantial performance of the Contract and can show by clear and convincing evidence that enforcement serves the needs, welfare, and best interest of the child. The Contract’s enforceability terminates per its own terms and/or when the adopted-child turns eighteen (18) years old, whichever comes first. Finally, the above constitutes the exclusive and entire remedy available for a party seeking enforcement of a Contract, and “no statutory or common law remedy shall be available for enforcement or damages in connection with an agreement.” 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2738(f) Alternatively, an adopted-child, upon reaching the age of twelve (12), may petition the Court for discontinuance of the Contract. A Court may only order discontinuance if there is clear and convincing evidence that it would serve the needs, welfare, and best interests of the adopted-child. If a party seeks enforcement and/or discontinuance for reasons which are “insubstantial, frivolous or not advanced in good faith, the court may award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing parties.” 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2742.

The above is simply an overview of the Amendments. It is clear that when handling an adoption matter, a practitioner must ensure full compliance with them and facilitate, to the best of his ability, the formation and ratification of a post-adoption contact agreement.

This article was originally published in The Legal Intelligencer on April 2, 2012 and can be found here.

I also represent employees in various situations involving private employers. The difference between representing employees working in the private sector is that generally a resolution can be reached between the parties without resorting to extensive and expensive litigation.  There are always exceptions, but it is generally easier dealing with businesses which are aware that fighting tooth and nail against a current or former employee, may not be cost-effective for them in the long run, and may also be bad for other employees’ morale. Private businesses, or their lawyers, generally consider the effect litigation will have on their bottom line, even if they feel they have a wonderful defense.

However, government entities don’t seem to take into consideration the financial impact of litigating a case, whether it is before a government agency, or in court. This disappoints me to no end, in a couple of ways. First, I feel that my money is being wasted as a taxpayer. Government agencies have attorneys working for them, and their mantra seems to be “we don’t have authority to offer any money (or a very low amount is offered) to settle this case”. This is laughable, because the Federal Government obviously has gobs of money, and seems to waste a lot of it. I am not saying agencies should give money to every employee who makes a claim, but a cost benefit analysis, which is routinely performed by private business, should be conducted. I have two examples where the agencies are spending thousands and thousands of dollars against long-term employees who they are attempting to remove from their jobs. The first example is that the Postal Service is opposing a man who can perform his work if he is permitted to sit in a sliding chair due to a back condition, and has been provided with this chair for many years.  They have removed his chair, and now he is receiving unemployment compensation because he is not being permitted to work. We are fighting to have his chair returned to him, permitting him to work. Unfortunately, this type of situation is rampant these days as the Postal Service is losing money, and is trying to eliminate disabled employees who can work if given a small accommodation as required by the Americans with Disability Act.

The second example is that at a recent hearing five agency employees spent the day waiting to testify instead of doing their assigned work, in a case where a 25 year government employee who was removed for reasons which are certainly arguable, would have accepted a very reasonable settlement.

In certain forums, if the initiating party wins the case, attorney’s fees and costs are paid by the agency.  So, in both of these cases a cost benefit analysis would definitely favor settlement. Yet time and time again, agencies will spend thousands and thousands of dollars fighting a case.

That brings me to the second cost of these types of cases. Do we want our government agencies to hammer away at average people, usually employees who don’t earn a lot of money? In most cases, each side is not 100% right. Also, employees who work with the employee pursuing the matter, or have worked with them, avidly follow these matters, and quite often retain an attorney because a fellow employee did, or they don’t appreciate the firm stance the agency takes against a fellow employee, and become demoralized and unhappy in their work situation.

Therefore, my point is this, and it is a point very popular in politics these days, I feel agencies should operate as businesses, and part of the business decisions they make should be the best way to resolve a matter in which each party leaves with something.  This analysis happens daily in private industry and the legal system? I suggest that using the financial might of the Federal Government against its citizens and employees, is not the best way to manage tax dollars and employees.

To see this post and more, go to my blog Toughlawyerlady here!

Over my five years of serving with the CLCP, I have had the privilege of helping hundreds of people with their legal issues. I have been approached with all manner of issues, including but not limited to landlord-tenant, custody, support, divorce, social security, unemployment compensation, disability, debt collection, criminal and estate cases. The experience has blessed both me and the client; the client receives free or greatly discounted legal assistance while I reap the benefits of knowing I am truly helping the less fortunate and living out my Christian faith in a practical way. I am confident in saying that virtually everyone who has served with the CLCP has had a similar experience.

Attorneys have received the great gift of knowing about the law, how to navigate it and how to help people with their legal issues, and they bear some responsibility for sharing it with others. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Bar Association recommends that attorneys perform 50 pro bono hours per year and the CLCP is a wonderful place to volunteer. Aside from the CLCP, the Philadelphia area has many opportunities and organizations to assist people on a pro bono or low-fee basis. These include:

• Community Legal Services of Philadelphia
• The Philadelphia VIP program
• The Philadelphia Legal Assistance Center
• The Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia
• The Juvenile Law Center
• The Women Against Abuse Legal Center
• The Nationalities Service Center
• The SeniorLAW Center
• The Support Center for Child Advocates
• The Regional Housing Legal Services
• The Legal Clinic for the Disabled, and many others.

It is an extremely satisfying feeling knowing that one has given of oneself to help someone else in a profound way, not to mention the practical legal experience it can give an attorney simply because of the wide scope and breadth of the legal issues involved with the clients. Furthermore, the impact a volunteer attorney can have on someone’s life cannot be underestimated. If you are not involved in pro bono work, or with an organization as described above, I truly encourage you to become involved; you will be greatly rewarded. Indeed, the great irony of my volunteering experience is that the benefit I can provide to my clients is far less than the benefit I receive from them by the privilege of serving them.

Originally published in The Legal Intelligencer Blog on March 23, 2012 and can be found here.